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The Policy Paper Series
The Robert Schuman Centre’s Policy Paper Series adds a further dimension to 
its existing publications which included the lean Monnet Chair Papers and the 
Working Papers. This series aims to disseminate the views of a person or a 
group on a particular policy matter, specifically in the field of European 
integration
The European University Institute and the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies are not responsible for the proposals and opinions expressed by the 
author(s).
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In September 2000, the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University 
Institute inaugurated a new Transatlantic Programme, established to conduct 
policy-oriented and basic research on the subjects of transatlantic relations and 
transatlantic governance. Throughout its first two years of activities, the 
programme has focused largely on the US-EU relationship, including trade and 
economic issues, as well as the roles of the transatlantic partners in larger 
questions of global governance.
Throughout the life of the Transatlantic Programme, the issue of climate 
change has proven to be one of the most important - and one of the most 
difficult - issues in transatlantic relations. As James Meadowcroft’s report 
demonstrates, the United States and the European Union have long taken starkly 
differing approaches to the problem of global climate change. These differences 
have, in turn, manifested themselves in persistent disagreement at the global 
level, particularly as the international community moves to implement the 
commitments of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol. Transatlantic tensions turned into transatlantic rupture 
when, in March 2001, the Bush Administration announced that the United States 
would not be bound by the Kyoto Protocol, which it pronounced “dead.”
The departure of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol has raised a 
number of pressing policy issues for the European Union and its Member States. 
These issues were the subject of a transatlantic workshop held at the European 
University Institute on 21-22 June 2002. The findings of this workshop, and the 
policy recommendations that emerged from it, are concisely summarized in this 
report by James Meadowcroft. As the conference organizers, we asked Dr. 
Meadowcroft to write a report that would be simultaneously accessible to the 
general reader and specific enough in its analysis and its proposals to be of help 
in directing European climate change policy. It was, frankly, a nearly impossible 
task, but one that Dr. Meadowcroft has managed to pull off.
A few words of thanks are in order, not least to the participants of the 
workshop, who are listed in the appendix to the report. Thanks also to the 
Transatlantic Programme and its Director, Helen Wallace; to the BP 
Corporation, which generously provided sponsorship for the programme and for 
the workshop. Above all, we wish to thank James Meadowcroft for an excellent 
and informative report on the policy options open to the European Union as it 
struggles to implement the Kyoto Protocol without America.
Susan Baker, University of Cardiff





























































































Since 1990 the international community has conducted complex negotiations 
to secure global agreements to address climate change. The Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (1992), the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the 
Marrakech Accords (2001) are important landmarks in this process. The 
Kyoto Protocol, which limits greenhouse gas emissions from the developed 
countries, is likely to enter into force in 2003.
The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol has significant 
consequences. The absolute emission reductions secured under the agreement 
during the first commitment period (2008-2012) will be substantially less than 
originally anticipated. There will be less demand for credits secured through 
the three flexibility mechanisms (Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and 
the Clean Development Mechanism), and the associated financial flows will 
be reduced. The legitimacy o f the regime has also been weakened by the 
refusal of the world’s only super-power, and largest emitter of greenhouse 
gasses, to participate.
US reluctance to implement a significant programme of domestic 
greenhouse gas reduction acts as a drag on other state’s efforts to maintain and 
intensify their abatement efforts. In particular, it strengthens the worry that 
those who take vigorous action will be at a competitive disadvantage in 
relation to US industries that continue to rely on cheap supplies of carbon 
energy.
Two broad issues now confront European decision-makers: the domestic 
implementation of the agreements concluded to date, and the future evolution 
of the climate change regime.
On the domestic front, European leaders must ensure that they have in 
place policies and measures to secure the agreed reductions. In the year 2000 
EU carbon dioxide emissions were 0.5% down on 1990 levels. Thus the EU 
achieved its declared goal of stabilising carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 
levels by 2000, and it has realised almost half the 8% cut in total greenhouse 
gas emissions required by the Kyoto Protocol. Yet the picture remains 
worrying. The bulk of the reductions were secured in just two member states, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Projections suggest that in the absence of 
new initiatives EU greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 will be at 1990 levels — 




























































































Proposals for additional measures now working their way through EU 
decision procedures or that are under active consideration include directives 
on emissions trading, the energy performance of buildings, the regulatory and 
fiscal promotion of biofuels, combined heat and power production, transport 
infrastructure and user charges, energy-efficient public procurement, and 
fluorinated gases. The EU emission-trading scheme is especially important. 
Provided it is not weakened as it passes through the EU’s complex co-decision 
procedures, it has the potential to encourage significant cost-efficient 
abatement.
Continued reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through the first Kyoto 
commitment period and beyond will require a complex mix of policies across 
the EU. In developing new initiatives particular attention should be given to: 
public education; transparency, accountability and participation; exploiting 
policy synergies-, abolishing polluter subsidies', sectoral integration-, 
developing green technologies', research', and adaptation.
On the international front thoughts are already turning to the second 
commitment period (2013-2017). Future negotiations will be shaped by many 
factors including: developments in climate-related events and science; whether 
the US initiates credible domestic and/or cross-national abatement 
programmes; the structure of the existing regime, and the fact that new targets 
are to be agreed before experience has accumulated with the practical 
operation of the Kyoto mechanisms; and prevailing economic conditions and 
the broader international context.
In engaging with the international process European decision-makers 
should continue to press an ambitious climate change agenda, make greater 
efforts to support developing countries, and engage constructively with the 
United States. With respect to the next commitment period, targets for 
developed states should signal their intention to maintain a downward 
emissions trajectory. Excess emissions allowances — ‘hot air’ — should be 
curtailed. And a flexible and differentiated approach should be adopted to 
draw developing countries into emissions abatement efforts. Greater attention 
should also be devoted to adaptation, because many of the poorest countries 
are expected to bear the initial brunt of the negative impacts of the changing 
climate.
Climate change is a long-term problem, but decisions made in the next 
two or three decades could have a dramatic impact on rates and levels o f 
warming experienced during the remainder o f  the twenty-first century. 




























































































already exist or are within reach. But their adoption requires economic and 
social change and a substantial political commitment.
In coming years the international community is likely to take modest 
additional steps towards carbon abatement. Such efforts can slow the growth 
of global emissions -  holding out the hope of lowered rates and levels of 
warming in the coming century. And they provide experience in developing 
technologies and building institutions needed to make a more determined 





























































































Over the past fifteen years climate change has emerged as an increasingly 
important issue for domestic and international policy. At a point when the Kyoto 
Protocol -  the first legally binding international agreement to cap greenhouse 
gas emissions -  appears about to enter into force, it is worth pausing to assess 
the implications of this dossier for European policy makers.
Climate change first attracted international attention in the mid-1980s. 
Concern about the long-term build up of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere 
and the possibility of damaging the global climate system led to calls for action. 
In 1988 the United Nations Environment Programme and the World 
Meteorological Organisation established the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) to review scientific knowledge in this area. The results 
of the IPCCs First Assessment Report in 1990 were sufficiently worrying to 
prompt the opening of formal international negotiations to draft a climate 
change agreement.
Subsequent IPCC Reports suggested that a human influence on global 
climate was now discernible, and that warming was likely to accelerate in the 
coming century. According to the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (2001), 
global surface temperatures rose 0.6°C over the course of the 20th century. In 
the Northern Hemisphere it was likely that the 1990s was the warmest decade, 
and 1998 the warmest year, in the past 1,000 years. ‘Most of the wanning 
observed over the last 50 years’ could be attributed ‘to human activities’.1 And, 
in the absence of remedial measures, temperatures could be expected to rise 
between 1.4°C and 5.8°C over the next century.
While many uncertainties surround climate change, the scientific 
consensus is that its overall impact will be problematic.2 As temperatures rise, 
weather patterns will shift. On a global scale precipitation will increase, but 
changes to its geographic and temporal distribution will lead to increased risks 
of both drought and flooding. Extreme weather events may become more 
frequent and damaging. Sea levels will rise due to thermal expansion of the 
oceans, the retreat of glaciers, and perhaps some melting of polar ice. Warming 
will be most pronounced at higher latitudes, but regional and local climactic 
effects will vary.
Natural ecosystems and human societies are certain to suffer disruption. 
Changing temperatures and rainfall will affect agriculture and other economic 
activities. The erosion of food security, more extreme weather events, and the 
spread of disease will affect human health.3 And settlements will be threatened 




























































































while elsewhere species already under pressure will face increased risk of 
extinction.
Negative consequences will be more widespread and also more 
pronounced for faster rates of change and for higher absolute levels of warming. 
The impacts will be especially acute in developing countries where populations 
are more vulnerable, and resources to fund adaptation are limited.4
Particular worries that emerge from the scientific findings are:
• the pace o f  change: the rate of warming anticipated for the next century is 
likely to be faster than any experienced in the past 10,000 years, and such a 
rapid shift in climate will make it difficult for human and natural systems to 
adapt.
• the possibility o f large-scale discontinuities: historical evidence suggests that 
the climate system does not display a smooth response to perturbation. At a 
certain point, small additional increases in temperature could provoke 
dramatic shifts in regional or global climate. Significant changes to the 
pattern of ocean circulation (such as shutting down the Gulf Stream that 
warms the climate of northern Europe), or the melting of the polar caps 
(provoking a dramatic rise in sea levels) cannot be excluded in the longer 
term.
• the extended nature o f  the problem: substantial warming is already locked 
into the system, because of the historic accumulation of emissions. So long as 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere continue to increase, 
warming will go on. Indeed, even after the stabilisation of atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases the momentum of the climate system 
implies that temperatures will continue to rise (at a gradually decreasing rate) 
for several centuries.
• the magnitude o f relevant uncertainties: although climate science has 
advanced rapidly, great uncertainties remain. Even the equilibrium 
temperature that would eventually follow from maintaining a particular 
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide remains unclear. Current 
estimates for carbon dioxide stabilisation at 450 parts per million (ppm) 
suggest a temperature rise ranging between 1.5°C and 3.9°C. For stabilisation 
at 550ppm (approximately double pre-industrial levels) these figures rise to 
between 2°C and 6°C.5 This is to say nothing of the difficulty of establishing 
thresholds that might trigger large scale changes to the climate system, 




























































































warming, or developing detailed predictions of regional and local 
consequences attendant upon any given temperature rise.
• the scale o f emissions reductions necessary to limit the temperature increase 
to a few degrees: to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere, it is necessary to radically reduce ongoing emissions. The IPCC 
analysis suggests that to stabilise concentrations at 450ppm (60% above pre­
industrial levels) global carbon dioxide emissions would need to fall below 
1990 base-line levels ‘within a few decades’, and to ‘continue to decrease 
steadily thereafter’ until they constituted ‘a very small fraction of current 
emissions’.6
Many industrial and agricultural processes produce greenhouse gasses, 
especially the combustion of fossil fuels that have powered economic 
development since the industrial revolution. As economies, population levels 
and standards of living grow, emissions typically rise. Industrialised countries 
have been responsible for four fifths of carbon dioxide emissions during the 
twentieth century. They currently account for two-thirds of global emissions. In 
per capita terms the difference is stark: US per capita carbon emissions now 
stand at more than five times the global average. Per capita emissions in China 
and Brazil are about half the global average. India’s are a quarter of the average, 
while many of the poorest countries have per capita levels less than 10% of the 
global average.7 Nevertheless, emissions in many developing countries are 
rising. The International Energy Agency reports that over the next thirty years 
two-thirds of the increase in energy-related carbon dioxide emissions will come 
from developing countries.8 But on current trends, annual releases from China 
(the largest developing country emitter) will remain below US levels for decades 
to come.9
Responding to climate change implies two fundamental tasks:
• action to slow the accumulation o f  greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in 
order to forestall further warming and
• adaptation to warming that is already underway
Releases of methane (from agriculture, waste, and fossil fuel extraction and 
distribution), nitrous oxide (from agriculture, industry and catalytic converters) 
and fluorinated gasses must all be brought under control. But over the long term 
the impacts of carbon dioxide predominate.10 Central to reducing net carbon 
dioxide emissions are efforts to: i) increase energy conservation and efficiency, 
ii) switch to low-carbon, carbon-neutral, and non-carbon fuels, iii) expand 
natural ‘sinks’ which draw-down carbon from the atmosphere (such as forests), 
and iv) encourage carbon sequestration (long term storage in geological 




























































































Adaptation implies forward planning and expenditure to allow human and 
natural systems to adjust to the changing climate. It has implications for 
agricultural practices, fresh water management, flood defences, settlement 
patterns, public heath priorities, and nature conservation. Adaptation is a critical 
issue in many developing countries where changing weather patterns will pose a 
direct and immediate threat to human life and welfare.
International climate negotiations -  the story so far
Since 1990 international climate change negotiations have followed a tortuous 
course. Important landmarks in the process were the conclusion of the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), the Kyoto Protocol (1997) 
and the Marrakech Accords (2001) (see Box A). As compared to some other 
industrialised countries, the European Union has in recent years generally 
favoured more stringent legally-binding emissions targets. An early priority for 
its negotiators was securing the ‘EU bubble’ which allowed abatement 
commitments to be redistributed among member states so long as their summed 
emissions remained within the overall EU allowance. This approach allowed the 
EU to take account of differences in the energy structure, emissions patterns and 
development levels of individual member states (see Box B). The EU has been 
sceptical of the ‘flexibility mechanisms’ built into the Kyoto accord (see Box 
C), and looked for fixed limits on the extent to which they could be used to meet 
mandatory reduction targets. It resisted the expansion of the range of land-use, 
land-use change and forestry activities (LULUCF) which could be counted 
against the Kyoto targets, and supported a strong compliance regime.
The United States was more hesitant about mandatory controls, and later 
worried that its Kyoto target was too strict. It advocated a regime covering all 
the major greenhouse gasses (not just carbon dioxide), championed emissions 
trading, and the inclusion of LULUCF activities -  in order to lower compliance 
costs and ensure it could meet its target. Other industrialised countries such as 
Australia, Canada, Norway and Japan shared many of the US concerns. Another 
group of developed countries included Russia and other successor states to the 
former Soviet Union. Since their emissions had fallen well below the 1990 
benchmark levels, these countries looked forward to selling entitlements to this 
‘hot air’ to other industrialised states that might be struggling to meet their 
Kyoto targets through domestic reductions.
The developing states of G77 + China tend to approach climate change 
within the context of broader disputes with the industrialised world. They have 
looked for increased financial flows and technology transfers to accelerate their 
development efforts, to assist the shift to cleaner energy, and to develop climate 




























































































have remained adamant that the industrialised states must take the first step. 
Two smaller groups of developing countries have also influenced negotiations. 
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), concerned about rising sea levels, 
has advocated vigorous action. And OPEC nations, worried about falling oil 
revenues, have tried to slow proceedings.
[Box A]
International climate change agreements
Three agreements lie at the core of the international climate change regime.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) established the
basic international commitment to address risks posed by human induced
climate change. The Convention entered into force in 1994, and now includes
186 parties. Its key features include:
• the objective of stabilising ‘atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases at levels that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system’.
• ‘principles’ to guide the international response to climate change including 
‘equity’, a notion of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ of all 
nations, the precautionary principle, sustainable development, and cost 
effectiveness.
• an obligation on all parties to take action to deal with climate change 
including the preparation of programmes for mitigation and adaptation, the 
encouragement of scientific research, and submission of reports on 
national emissions and response efforts.
• a specific obligation for industrialised states (Annex 1 countries) to take 
the lead in mitigation efforts, as they are responsible for the largest share 
of emissions and can better afford action. An indicative (non-legally 
binding) target was set for Annex 1 parties to return their greenhouse gas 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The most prosperous of the 
industrialised states (Annex 2 countries) assumed the additional obligation 
of assisting developing countries to adjust to climate change and to meet 
their obligations under the Convention.
• the establishment of the Convention institutions including the Conference 
of the Parties (that meets annually to review developments), two specialist 
organisations (the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation that meet twice a 





























































































The Kyoto Protocol (1997) set the first legally binding greenhouse gas 
emissions targets for the industrialised states. Key features of the Kyoto 
Protocol include:
• the commitment of Annex 1 countries to meet quantitative emissions 
targets during a first commitment period (from 2008 to 2012), for a 
basket of six greenhouse gasses: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SFs).
• the definition of individual emissions targets for each Annex I party 
(ranging from an 8% reduction on 1990 levels for EU states to a 10% 
increase on 1990 levels for Iceland) which, when taken all together, 
would result in at least a 5% reduction in total Annex 1 country 
emissions.
• the creation of three ‘flexibility mechanisms’ -  joint implementation (JI), 
the clean development mechanism (CDM) and emissions trading (ET) -  
to allow countries to co-operate in achieving reductions and to reduce the 
cost of meeting their commitments.
• the inclusion within the accounting framework of certain ‘land-use, land- 
use change and forestry’ (LULUCF) activities (that can reduce emissions 
from forest clearances or increase long-term carbon storage in biological 
‘sinks’).
• the provision for the Protocol to enter into force when it is ratified by 55 
parties including Annex 1 countries accounting for 55% of total 1990 
carbon dioxide emissions.
The Marrakech Accords (2001) provided agreement on the detailed rules 
for the actual operation of the Kyoto Protocol. Among the more important 
features were:
• finalising detailed rules for the operation of the three flexibility 
mechanisms (CDM, JI and ET), and the inclusion of a proviso that 
reductions achieved through the use of such mechanisms should be 
‘supplemental to domestic action’.
• broadening the range of LULUCF activities included within the 
accounting framework, and increasing significantly the maximum 
allowance for forest management credited to Russia.
• establishing three new funds to assist developing countries with their 
climate change adjustment and mitigation efforts.
• adopting a comparatively strict compliance procedure, which includes 
close monitoring of national efforts and reporting, and penalties for 
failure to meet targets.
• accepting the principle that emission reduction should proceed in ‘a 
manner conducive to narrowing the per capita differences between 




























































































The architecture of the Kyoto Protocol is a complex amalgam, reflecting the 
compromises required to keep the parties at the table.11 Many of the proposals of 
US negotiators -  particularly the six-gas approach, emissions trading, and a 
broad interpretation of LULUCF activities -  were incorporated into the 
agreements. And yet the likelihood of US ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was 
small even before the Bush administration publicly repudiated the agreement in 
March 2001. Many US politicians remain unconvinced of the need for urgent 
action on climate change. Indeed the Senate had already passed a resolution in 
1997 opposing US acceptance of a binding agreement unless the administration 
could demonstrate that no additional costs would be imposed on the US 
economy, and that a ‘meaningful commitment’ to greenhouse gas reduction had 
been secured from developing countries.
Paradoxically, the public US disavowal of Kyoto helped galvanise the 
resolve of other states to reach an agreement that would allow the Protocol to 
come into force. The EU and the G77 + China provided the critical drive to 
finalise the Kyoto ‘rulebook’ in Marrakech.12 But the US withdrawal also 
strengthened the negotiating hand of Russia and other developed states (whose 
support was then essential if the Protocol was to be ratified by enough parties so 
that it could enter into force). And the EU had to give way on many issues, 
including a numerical cap on use of the flexibility mechanisms, the extension of 
credited LULUCF activities, an increase in the forest management allowance for 
Russia, and a weakening of the compliance regime.
During recent negotiations (COP 8, October/November 2002) divisions 
between developed and developing states again occupied centre stage. Despite 
EU efforts, the ‘Dehli Ministerial Declaration’ included no reference to 
abatement efforts after the end of the first Kyoto commitment period in 2012. 
Developing countries resisted opening the discussion on the broader future of 
the climate regime, as they were unwilling to consider any extension to the 
range of countries involved in mandatory controls. In a remarkable turn around, 
US negotiators agreed that it would be unfair to expect developing countries to 
consider emissions targets. Nevertheless, the meeting made progress on a 
number of technical issues, including rules for the CDM, reporting 



































































































Austria - 8 - 13
Belgium -8 - 7.5
Denmark -8 -21.0
Finland -8 0
France - 8 0
Germany -8 - 21
Greece -8 + 25
Italy -8 - 6.5
Ireland -8 + 13
Luxembourg - 8 - 28
Netherlands -8 - 6
Portugal -8 + 27
Spain -8 + 15
Sweden -8 + 4
United Kingdom -8 - 12.5
EU 15 -8 - 8
Kyoto and its critics
Political and economic interests that have opposed ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol in the United States and other developed countries have emphasised the 
uncertain science surrounding climate change and the high cost o f carbon 
abatement. They argue that at this point there is doubt about the scale of the 
problem, and that mandatory emissions controls would impose significant 
economic costs. The suggestion is that we would do better to wait for scientific 
clarity, and that the more prosperous and technologically developed societies of 
the future will be better placed to take appropriate action.
The response to such criticism points out that there is already a substantial 
scientific consensus that the first effects of human induced climate change are 
becoming manifest, and that the longer term consequences may be serious. The 
complexity of the climate system means that substantial uncertainties will 
remain far into the future. And the risks of deferring action may be significant, 
especially if warming turns out to be at the high end of the spectrum or the 




























































































of early abatement action are likely to have been substantially overstated. And 
the earlier societies engage with the problem, the more time they give 
themselves to learn how to adapt to climate change and to control emissions, so 
facilitating a smoother transition to a carbon-neutral energy system.
Opponents have also derided the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto 
accords. Projections of carbon dioxide emissions over the coming century show 
that implementation of these abatement targets causes barely a blip in the overall 
trend of rising greenhouse emissions. Even if proportionate reductions were 
secured in each subsequent commitment period, global emissions would 
continue to rise. Inclusion of the US in future rounds could improve matters 
somewhat. But ultimately the upward trend would prevail.13 The explanation is 
that the falling emissions of Annex 1 countries are overwhelmed by rapidly 
rising emissions from the developing world.
Yet the Kyoto Protocol was never intended as a comprehensive 
solution to climate change; and scenarios that extrapolate its impact over many 
decades while assuming no extension of the countries involved in abatement 
efforts miss the point. Instead, the Protocol has been understood as part of a 
long-term process to create global institutions to stabilise atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gasses. It is a first step that commits Annex 1 
countries to modest initial reductions, and can serve as a bridge towards more 
substantial future cuts, and the extension of the pool of participating countries, 
in subsequent commitment periods.
A parallel criticism suggests the Kyoto regime is unfair because it requires 
some states to make reductions while others are let off the hook altogether. As 
with the previous objection, attention is drawn to the position of developing 
countries. Why should these nations -  especially those with rapidly rising 
standards of living (such as South Korea, Chile or Singapore) or huge 
populations (such as China or India) -  be exempt from action, while 
industrialised countries are obliged to assume costs that may place them at a 
competitive disadvantage? One response here is simply to point to the text of the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. This explicitly emphasises the 
obligation of industrialised states to take the lead in abatement efforts.
More fundamentally, the idea of equity -  of a fair contribution from each 
country -  must be a cornerstone of any serious collective international response 
to climate change. On the one hand, equity suggests that those who have created 
a problem should take responsibility to deal with it. And Annex 1 countries still 
account for two-thirds of global emissions. Moreover, if one considers historical 
emissions patterns the overwhelming responsibility of the industrialised 




























































































able to take remedial action should do so. Again, the wealthy countries of the 
North are better placed to curb their emissions than the poorer countries of the 
South.
[Box C]
Flexibility Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol established three ‘flexibility mechanisms’ to facilitate 
cost-effective greenhouse gas abatement efforts.
Emissions Trading (ET) allows countries subject to binding emissions 
controls (Annex 1 Parties) to buy and sell emission entitlements from each 
other. States that can achieve low cost abatement are able to sell on ‘assigned 
amounts units’ to those having more difficulty meeting their targets, thus 
reducing the overall cost of international compliance.
Joint Implementation (JI) involves project-based co-operation within the 
Annex 1 area. It allows states to gain credit for emissions reductions they 
have helped to secure in the territory of another Annex 1 Party. Such 
‘emissions reduction units’ could be acquired, for example, by replacing an 
outdated power plant with a more carbon-efficient alternative. LULUCF 
activities are permitted under JI, but parties have agreed not to count nuclear 
power under this framework.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) involves project-based co­
operation between developed and developing states. Annex 1 countries can 
gain credit for emissions reductions they help achieve in non-Annex 1 
countries. Afforestation and reforestation activities can be included up to a 
specified limit, and again nuclear power projects are excluded.
In order to benefit from the flexibility mechanisms parties must have ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol and have satisfied its reporting and procedural 
requirements. Each Annex 1 Party must maintain a reserve to ensure that 
trades will not endanger meeting its commitment period target. Complex rules 
regulate the detailed operation of ET, JI and the CDM, and bodies have been 
established to monitor and authenticate activities conducted under the three 
mechanisms.
Of course, the key categories of the convention (Annex 1 and non-Annex 1) are 
extremely crude. There are marked differences among developed states with 
respect to levels of economic development, structural factors that underpin 




























































































sharing agreement can be justified by equity as well as expediency. But there are 
even greater differences within the developing world: some states are rapidly 
approaching the standards of living (and emission levels) of Annex 1 countries; 
others are growing but have comparatively low emissions; while some remain 
mired in economic stagnation and poverty. Differentiating the responsibilities of 
these states remains a key task for the future. But it does not obviate the 
obligation of the industrialised countries to take the first step today.
A rather different set of objections is formulated by those who accept that 
serious action on climate change is necessary, and agree that developed states 
must go first, but argue that Kyoto was not the best way to begin. Such critics 
point to the overly complex structure of the agreement, worry about the 
technical and organisational demands placed on the Protocol’s administrative 
bodies, and are concerned about opportunities for parties to manipulate the 
system. The argument is that the arcane structure of the accord results from two 
early blunders. The first was to search for a solution within the UN framework. 
This implied vastly complex negotiations among more than a hundred countries 
with very different preoccupations. And it burdened the discussions with the 
legacy of past UN disputes and intrigues.14 The alternative would have been to 
explore a solution among a smaller group of like-minded industrialised 
countries, perhaps within the ambit of the OECD. Such a limited initial 
agreement could have been extended later to additional parties -  an approach 
that has already proven its worth in other international environmental 
conventions.
The second mistake was to insist on binding targets, when so much 
uncertainty surrounds climate change. For as soon as caps were to be binding, 
national negotiators were under pressure to keep their own target low (to 
minimise the danger of overshoot). And the states most worried about the 
stringency of their targets had an incentive to broaden the agreement’s coverage 
(more gasses, sinks as well as emissions) so as to widen their compliance 
options. It has been argued that a better approach would have involved a hybrid 
‘quantity-cap / price-cap’ emissions trading system focused on carbon dioxide.13 
National emissions targets, and a maximum price for emissions permits, would 
be agreed at the outset of the commitment period. Then, should some 
unexpected shock push the carbon price above the agreed ceiling, national 
governments would be empowered to issue additional permits at the capped 
price. Such a regime sacrifices environmental certainty (no more than X tons of 
carbon will be released) for economic certainty (the price of carbon cannot 
exceed Y). But since the reduction targets are in any case arbitrary (no time 
frame or concentration level for stabilisation has been agreed), a reduction in 
economic uncertainty is more valuable — because it reassures actors they are not 




























































































Although there is truth to some of these arguments, in the immediate 
context their relevance is limited. The historical trajectory climate change 
negotiations have traced over the past 15 years cannot be ignored. The 
agreements result from complex interaction among many parties, and they are 
not those that would have been generated by an ideal process of design. As the 
architecture of an inclusive and comprehensive regime was built up over time, it 
became difficult to reverse direction without unravelling the whole enterprise. 
While a ‘quantity-cap / price-cap’ approach has advantages, it also has 
difficulties -  particularly in setting the international price at which additional 
emission permits could be issued.17 In any case, such an approach -  which 
allows states to agree to pursue more ambitious quantity-targets because they 
have the assurance of a maximum price — could still be considered by the 
Parties to the Kyoto protocol for subsequent commitment periods. Moreover, it 
should be remembered that it was not the detailed architecture o f the current 
system that caused the US government to balk at ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. 
Rather it was their current unwillingness to accept any system of mandatory 
controls of greenhouse gas emissions in developed countries.
A bifurcation of the international regime
Assuming that Russia makes good on its pledge to ratify, the Kyoto Protocol 
will probably enter into force in 2003. Today all states remain linked through the 
institutional structures of the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Yet 
with respect to mandatory emissions reductions the regime has bifurcated. On 
the one hand, the vast majority of countries will participate in the Kyoto system 
that imposes legally binding restrictions on developed country emissions, and 
ties developing countries to this effort through the CDM and various financial 
and technology transfer mechanisms. On the other hand, the United States -  
joined perhaps by Australia -  will for the time being remain outside the system.
This situation has significant consequences for the functioning and 
anticipated impacts of the Kyoto regime. In the first place, the absolute emission 
reductions secured under the Protocol during the first commitment period will 
be substantially less than originally anticipated. Some developed states will not 
be bound by the targets. Moreover, the compromises on sinks made in the final 
round of negotiations mean that the emission reductions required of states inside 
the mandatory regime to meet their Kyoto targets will be lessened. This is 
because carbon-dioxide draw-down from a more extensive range of LULUCF 




























































































Second, there will be less demand for credits secured through the three 
flexibility mechanisms, and the associated financial flows will be reduced. The 
United States had been expected to rely heavily on these mechanisms to meet its 
commitments. Without US demand for emission entitlements, the price of 
purchasing emissions allowances from states with a surplus, or of gaining credits 
for carbon reduction under JI or the CDM, will fall dramatically.18 Indeed, 
recent studies suggest the price of carbon could approach zero unless Russia and 
other CIS states ‘bank’ (hold over until the next commitment period) a 
substantial proportion of their excess reserves.19 This is particularly true because 
the EU has pledged to meet most of its reductions internally. On one side, this 
implies lowered compliance costs for industrialised countries that have ratified 
Kyoto. On the other, it reduces financial benefits to Russia20 and other transition 
states, and restricts the potential advantage to developing countries from 
participation in CDM projects.
The longer-term political consequences o f the US defection are more 
difficult to assess. That the Kyoto system does not include the world’s only 
super power, and the largest emitter of greenhouse gasses, significantly reduces 
the regime’s overall effectiveness and legitimacy. It increases uncertainty in an 
already uncertain context. To the extent that the US is joined by other 
industrialised states, the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Kyoto regime would 
be further undermined.
Moreover, the US refusal to implement a significant programme of 
domestic greenhouse gas reductions acts as a drag on the resolve of other states 
to maintain and intensify their abatement efforts. In particular, it strengthens the 
worry that countries which take vigorous action will find themselves at a 
competitive disadvantage in relation to US industries which continue to rely on 
cheap supplies of carbon energy. Nor does this bode well for efforts to further 
engage developing countries in the control of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Without US participation it can be argued that the commitment of the developed 
states remains implausible. If the world’s richest nation is unprepared to expend 
resources to address climate change, why should developing states make 
sacrifices to do so?
Still, there have been suggestions that a bifurcation of the control regime 
is not entirely negative. It opens the possibility of a multi-track approach to 
emissions abatement, where different groups of countries experiment with 
different ways of tackling the problem.2 Since even Kyoto enthusiasts admit 
the accords are far from perfect, perhaps it is wise to keep options open in case 




























































































The problem is that any serious alternative system would depend first and 
foremost on the willingness o f the US to take domestic action to control 
greenhouse gas emissions. The Climate Change Initiative launched by the Bush 
administration in February 2002 proposed to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity 
of the US economy by 18% between 2002 and 2012, largely through voluntary 
action in the corporate sector. Analysis of the plan suggests that this target 
barely differs from a ‘business as usual’ scenario, and would actually be 
compatible with a 30% increase in US emissions by 2012.22 The Initiative does 
have positive features, notably an explicit admission of the importance of 
climate change, increased research expenditure, and provision for establishing 
accurate inventories (which could enlarge the US corporate constituency 
favouring mandatory emission controls). In the US more generally, there have 
been a host of recent climate initiatives at the local and state level23 (notably 
legislation in California concerning carbon dioxide emissions from cars), and 
some evidence that the legislative branch is beginning to take climate change 
more seriously.
Nevertheless, there is no indication that the current US administration has 
any appetite for mandatory controls. And until the US moves in this direction, 
any ‘competition’ from a rival regime would amount to little more than a drag 
on the efforts of states that are prepared to act within the Kyoto framework.
The challenge facing Europe
In light of the general evolution of the climate dossier, there are two broad 
issues that confront European decision-makers. The first relates to European 
emission abatement and the practical implementation of the agreements 
negotiated so far. The second relates to the international stage, and the future 
evolution of the climate change regime. The two issues are inter-twined, but are 
best approached in turn.
Implementation within the European Union
On the domestic front, European leaders must now ensure that they have in 
place policies and measures that can secure the reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions to which they are committed. In the year 2000 EU carbon dioxide 
emissions were 0.5% down on 1990 levels. And total greenhouse gas emissions 
were 3.5% below those of 1990.24 Thus the EU achieved its declared goal 
of stabilising carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by 2000, and it has 
realised almost half the 8% cut required by the Kyoto accord. This is a 





































































































United States + 17
EU 15 - 0.5
Calculated from data in UNFCC online greenhouse gas 
inventory, November 2002.
Yet analysis of the character of the emission reductions and of current trends in 
member states reveals that the situation is more worrying.23 The bulk of the 
reductions were secured in a handful of member states -  especially Germany 
and the United Kingdom. According to the European Environment Agency 
about half of this was related to ‘one-off factors’, including German industrial 
restructuring (following unification) and the shift in UK electricity generation 
from coal to gas.26 While declines in methane and nitrous oxide emissions have 
been substantial, carbon dioxide emissions have proven more resistant, and 
emissions of fluorinated gases are rising rapidly. In the transport sector carbon 
dioxide emissions are growing strongly (up 18% between 1990 and 1999), 
eroding reductions secured in the energy and industrial sectors.27
Trends in EU energy use are not encouraging.28 Energy consumption 
continues to rise especially in the transport and household sectors. Efficiency 
improvements remain modest, with the energy intensity of the economy falling 
by only 0.9% per year during the 1990s. And without the German contribution 
energy intensity would actually have risen.29 By 2010 the switch from coal to 
gas will have been largely completed, and the retirement of existing nuclear 
facilities will put further pressure on carbon dioxide emissions. Renewable 
energy grew relatively slowly until the end of the 1990s, increasing its share of 
total energy consumption from 5.0% to 5.9%.30 While the fastest rise was in 






























































































Member state targets and actual emissions change 1990-2000
Member state Burden-sharing 
target 2008-2012
Change 1990-2000 as 
percentage of 1990 
levels
Austria - 13 + 2.7
Belgium - 7.5 + 6.3
Denmark -21.0 - 1.7
Finland 0 - 4.1
France 0 - 1.7
Germany - 21 - 19.1
Greece + 25 + 21.2
Italy - 6.5 + 0.7
Ireland + 13 + 24.0
Luxembourg - 28 - 45.1
Netherlands - 6 + 2.6
Portugal + 27 + 30.1
Spain + 15 + 33.7
Sweden + 4 - 1.9
UK - 12.5 - 12.6
EU 15 - 8 - 3.5
Targets expressed as percentage change on 1990 levels for 
Kyoto controlled greenhouse gasses excluding land use change 
and forestry.
Source EE A April 2002.
Of the member states allocated cuts under the EU burden sharing agreement, 
emissions in 2000 were up on 1990 levels in Austria (2.7%), Belgium (6.3%), 
Italy (3.9%), and the Netherlands (2.6%) (see Box E). Of member states 
allocated increases under the EU burden sharing agreement, emissions in 2000 
had already surpassed the 2008-12 target level in Spain (33.7% increase, with an 
EU target of 15%), Ireland (24% increase, with an EU target of 13%) and 
Portugal (30.1% increase with an EU target of 27%).31 The relative position of 
member states in meeting their burden sharing targets is captured by the EEA’s 





























































































Distance-to-target for EU Member States in 1999 
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Source: European Environment Agency
Projections suggest that in 2010, in the absence of new initiatives, EU 
greenhouse gas emissions will be at 1990 levels -  that is 8% above the Kyoto 
target. According to the EE A ‘large additional efforts’ will therefore be required 
from the EU and its member states if they are to collectively achieve their Kyoto 
target.32
EU member states have put in place a variety of policies and measures to 
control greenhouse gas emissions, including climate taxes, regulatory standards, 
and voluntary agreements with industry. Policy frameworks are particularly 
developed in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. At the 
European Union level recent initiatives include directives on landfill, the 




























































































auto manufacturers to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from passenger cars. The 
European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), established in June 2000, 
sponsored a multi-stakeholder review of more than 40 additional policy 
options.33 It identified measures that could in principle achieve reductions more 
than twice the size of the implementation gap identified by the EE A, at a cost of 
less than € 20 per carbon dioxide equivalent metric ton.34 Proposals that are now 
working their way through EU decision procedures or are under active 
consideration include directives on emission trading, the energy performance of 
buildings, the regulatory and fiscal promotion of biofuels, combined heat and 
power production, transport infrastructure and user charges, energy efficient 
public procurement, and fluorinated gases.
Among measures under discussion, the EU emission-trading scheme is 
especially important.35 The Commission proposal envisages a system covering 
carbon dioxide releases from 4000-5000 major industrial facilities whose 
emissions are expected to account for about 45% of the EU total in 2010.36 After 
a pilot phase the scheme would become mandatory across the EU, with 
substantial penalties (€50-100 per metric ton and automatic offset) for non- 
compliant firms. Member states would be responsible for setting emissions caps 
and allocating permits, subject to Commission review. The possibility of mutual 
recognition with trading schemes operated by other parties bound by Kyoto 
targets (such as Japan) would allow a linkage into the Kyoto emissions trading 
regime. When issues of monitoring are resolved it should be possible to extend 
the system to cover other gases, and eventually also a broader range of emitters. 
Moreover, the Commission has indicated its inclination to establish a link with 
the project-based Kyoto mechanisms of Joint Implementation and the CDM.
The broad-based nature of the system implies a considerable potential to 
encourage cost-efficient abatement. Considering that 29 of the 39 parties in 
Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol could ultimately be involved in the scheme (the 
existing EU, plus three EEA countries, and ten Accession countries)37, it could 
represent a significant leadership opportunity for the EU in pressing forward 
international greenhouse gas abatement efforts. But everything depends on the 
details of the scheme that is actually agreed through the complex co-decision 
procedures of the EU. To be economically efficient and environmentally 
effective, the system must be mandatory, with no opt-outs for member states, 
sectors or facilities, and control on the allowances issued by member states. In 
practice, restraining temporary opt-outs to the minimum is a more realistic 
expectation. But there are many other problematic details including how to 
achieve a link to the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms while maintaining the EU 





























































































Whatever the precise configuration of the emissions trading system, it is 
clear that continued reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through the first 
Kyoto commitment period and beyond requires a complex mix of policies across 
the EU -  involving governmental initiatives at the local, national and EU levels, 
and action in all economic sectors. The EU cannot rely on just a few states to 
provide reductions. Nor can the burden simply be imposed on large emitters in 
the energy and industry sectors. Over time, control efforts from other sectors 
such as transport and agriculture, from medium and smaller sized industrial 
facilities, and from service and retail enterprises, will become more important.
Orienting further domestic initiatives
This suggests that with respect to the European abatement effort particular 
attention should be given to a number of elements:
• Public education: substantial resources should be committed to raising 
citizen awareness about climate change. Polling data reveals that general 
levels of understanding of this issue remain disturbingly low. An effective 
and stable policy response cannot be based on public indifference. 
Addressing climate change will require a sustained social effort over many 
decades and have implications for all sectors of society. Unless the policy 
consensus is underpinned by genuine understanding, the people of Europe 
will not go on accepting changes that appear costly and inconvenient. 
Educational initiatives should popularise scientific understanding of the 
climate system, the sources and the potential impacts of climate change, and 
alternative remedial strategies. They should deal honestly with uncertainties, 
risks and the limits to knowledge. Attention should be paid to natural science, 
social and economic concerns, and ethical issues relating to future 
generations, developing countries, and non-human nature. The focus should 
be not only on schools and higher educational establishments, but also on 
public and governmental bodies, workplaces and businesses, the media, and 
the cultural industries.
• Transparency, accountability and participation: these essential
democratic values must be strengthened in making and implementing 
climate-related initiatives. Citizens will only accept the costs of an active 
climate policy if they are convinced that it is being developed in a fair and 
transparent manner. Moreover interactions with stakeholders are essential to 
identify practical and cost effective response strategies. Transparency and 
accountability are particularly important with respect to the central 
institutions of EU, for at present European political leaders are regarded with 
increasing scepticism by ordinary citizens. It is imperative that institutional 




























































































more straightforward and transparent, maintain the independence of the 
Commission, and prevent EU decision-making being dominated by closed- 
door deals among national governments. Otherwise EU structures will lack 
the legitimacy required to orient climate policy successfully.
• Policy synergies: it is important to fully exploit the potential synergies 
between climate change and other policy areas. This allows the attainment of 
multiple objectives, increases the ‘benefit’ side of the 'cost/benefif equation, 
and helps consolidate political coalitions and public support for reform. For 
example, promoting a modal shift from road to rail for goods transport 
alleviates air pollution, noise and congestion -  bringing immediate economic, 
health and amenity benefits -  as well are reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Energy efficiency initiatives can provide important financial savings, and 
more vigorous action with respect to end-use energy efficiency would be of 
particular value to small and medium enterprises.38 And the shift towards 
more sustainable agricultural practices (reducing livestock density and 
chemical applications and encouraging organic farming) can benefit human 
health, improve water and air quality, increase rural incomes, and promote 
nature conservation, as well as moderating greenhouse gas outputs.
• Abolition of polluter subsidies: subsidies and tax advantages are still being 
granted that encourage non climate-friendly economic behaviour. Their 
abolition is an example of the potential synergies referred to above -  
contributing both to climate change objectives and saving public money. Tax 
exemptions on fuel for agriculture, on energy for particular industrial 
producers, and support for carbon-rich fuels such as coal are cases in point. 
So too is the present structure of the Common Agricultural Policy with its 
emphasis on production subsidies. The absence of tax on aviation fuel, and 
VAT exemptions for airline tickets, have contributed to the explosive growth 
in this sector.39 There are major political obstacles to movement on such 
issues. And there are risks that hardship will be imposed on those whose 
livelihoods are bound up with such subsidies and exemptions. But changes 
can be phased in over time, and include provision for transitional relief.
• Sectoral integration: the integration of climate change considerations into 
decision-making across all policy sectors is essential. Again, it is only in this 
way that policy synergies can be identified and that the burden of adjustment 
can be equitably distributed across society. In this respect transport remains 
perhaps the most challenging sector. Emissions from road and air travel 
continue to grow, and member-state and EU initiatives in this area remain 
weak. A push to encourage a shift towards rail for the goods sector, to 
improve long distance passenger rail travel, and strengthen support for urban 




























































































should be another priority. It is unclear that biofuels actually have the 
potential in the transport sector that current EU policy suggests40, and 
emphasis might be better placed on hybrid and fuel cell vehicles.
• Green technologies: governments should aggressively promote the 
development and practical deployment of green technologies that can help 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Support should go to technologies, 
products and processes that can have some impact on emissions by the end of 
the first Kyoto commitment period (2012). But substantial resources should 
also be devoted to innovations that hold promise for the medium and longer 
term. Technology-forcing regulations, subsidies and tax deductions, 
public/private R & D consortia, and market-building initiatives should all be 
employed to accelerate technological development and commercial 
implementation. The objective should be to place EU enterprises at the
forefront o f global carbon-reducing, carbon-neutral and carbon-free energy 
technologies. Areas that require support include: energy efficiency in 
industrial, commercial and domestic contexts, co-generation, the accelerated 
introduction of new renewables (such as wind and solar), the integration of 
renewable and conventional supplies, the storage of renewable energy, and 
transport related initiatives (hybrid vehicles, alternative fuels).41 Particular 
emphasis should be placed on the hydrogen energy economy — including 
technologies for fuel cells and hydrogen distribution and storage -  as there is 
tremendous medium-term potential to green the automotive sector and to 
integrate new renewables into the energy system. Again there are synergies 
with other areas, including job creation. For example, more than 16,000 jobs 
in Denmark in 2000 were related to the wind energy sector.42
• Research: increased resources should be devoted to investigating the climate 
change problematic. Greater knowledge is essential if policy makers and 
citizens are to make environmentally prudent and economically sound 
decisions about appropriate response strategies. Important issues include the 
overall understanding of the climate system, the links between climate and 
ecological and human systems, social vulnerabilities and social adjustment, 
and abatement and mitigation options. Emergent technologies are crucial, but 
broader social, cultural, and ethical dimensions should not be neglected. And, 
while there are pressures to concentrate funding on a smaller number of large 
scale projects and consortia, a more pluralistic and decentred approach to 
research is appropriate, as it remains far from clear which avenues of 




























































































• Adaptation: programmes at member state and EU levels that can begin to 
adjust social practices to the changing climate are also important. Issues to be 
addressed here include water management; the evolution of agricultural 
systems; settlement patterns; the conservation of biodiversity; and disaster 
preparedness and relief. Business and other stakeholders should be actively 
involved in the development of such measures that have significant financial 
implications -  for example in the insurance sector.
Action on the international stage
Assuming that the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, international attention over 
the coming year will be focused on getting its structures up and running. But 
thoughts are already beginning to turn to the broader future of the climate 
regime, with negotiations on the second Kyoto commitment period (2013-2017) 
scheduled to begin in 2005 and conclude before 2008.
Future negotiations will be shaped by many factors including:
• major developments in climate-related events and science;
• whether the US (and any other hold-out states) initiate credible domestic 
and/or cross national abatement programmes;
• the structure of the existing regime, and the fact that new targets are to be 
agreed before experience has accumulated with the practical operation of the 
Kyoto mechanisms; and,
• prevailing economic conditions and the broader international context.
Issues that will attract attention in future negotiations include continued 
emissions control in developed states, squeezing ‘hot air’ from the Kyoto 
envelope, and deepening the involvement of developing countries.
With respect to emissions control in developed states a basic problem 
confronting negotiators is whether to try to agree longer-term targets and 
principles to guide the development of the abatement regime or to continue with 
the existing ad hoc and incremental practice. Possibilities for a more 
foundational approach include agreeing a) a maximum temperature rise target or 
an ultimate stabilisation target for greenhouse gas concentrations and/or b) 
principles to distribute future abatement burdens or emission entitlements.
A long term target would operationalise the Convention objective of 
avoiding dangerous disruption to the climate system by fixing a maximum level 
of future warming (say 3°C) or a stabilisation level for the atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gasses (say 550ppm for carbon dioxide). Such 




























































































link to social and ecological impacts, while a concentration-target points to the 
emissions driving the process. Since the Convention is about preventing damage 
it would be logical to start with a temperature-target (fixed by assessing 
anticipated impacts and risks), to work back to determine the required 
stabilisation level (and concentration trajectory)43, and then to fix the necessary 
emissions abatement pathway. But at each step in the causal chain (that leads 
from emissions to concentrations, to global temperature, to climate patterns, to 
human and ecological impacts) there are vast uncertainties. Establishing such 
long-term targets involves moral and political decisions about the size and 
distribution of acceptable damage and risks. Moreover, it has dramatic 
implications for the future emission trajectories and abatement costs for all 
states, including developing countries. In 1996 the EU Council of Ministers 
proposed that the global temperature rise should be limited to 2°C.44 But it is 
difficult to see how broad international agreement around such a figure could be 
secured in the next few years.
A set of detailed principles for distributing future abatement targets 
among developed countries would provide greater certainty to all actors. But 
such a formula would have to be agreed by negotiators worried about national 
particularities, and would remove some flexibility from the regime. It seems 
unlikely that such principles will be agreed except in very general terms. Thus 
the more or less ad hoc approach to negotiating commitments seems likely to 
continue.
There is also a possibility of altering the approach to emissions control. 
For the first commitment period developed states accepted absolute caps on their 
greenhouse gas output. But an alternative approach could be adopted for the 
next commitment period. Options include the ‘quantity-cap / price-cap’ 
mechanism discussed earlier, and other systems involving dynamic targets 
and/or dual targets.45 Such approaches might enhance the overall effectiveness 
of the collective emission reduction effort by reducing the pressure on parties to 
negotiate weak targets. But they would leave open the absolute emissions 
reductions that would be secured, add complexity, and require substantial 
adjustment to the Kyoto framework. It is not clear that much would be gained by 
opening up this issue before the beginning of the first commitment period, 
unless of course there was a serious possibility of drawing the US back to the 
negotiating table.
Assuming negotiations for the second commitment period remain focused 
on a mandatory cap, the issue becomes one of fixing a new set of emissions 
reduction targets. No doubt environmental groups will press for ambitious 
objectives, particularly in light of the de-facto loosening of the Kyoto goals with 




























































































operating within the Kyoto framework, and anxiety about the costs of meeting 
such a target — particularly without a similar effort by the United States -  will 
weigh heavily on the negotiations. Even holding emissions to Kyoto levels for 
another five years would require effort, because continuing growth pushes 
emissions upwards. No doubt some will suggest that a further round of 
reductions should be conditional on US willingness to make ‘a meaningful 
contribution’ to the abatement enterprise.
The EU has already set an internal target of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by 1% a year for the period extending from the end of the first 
commitment period until 2020.47 Added to the 8% reduction from the first 
commitment period, this would leave EU emissions 16% below 1990 levels by 
2020. Yet elsewhere official documents suggest that it is necessary to seek an 
international agreement to secure a 20% to 40% drop in global emissions by 
2020, and 70% reductions ‘in the long term’.48 But since emissions from 
developing countries have been rising steadily, an agreement to achieve global 
cuts on this scale by 2020 would require a much more concerted effort from 
developed states than the EU’s 1% per annum target indicates.
With respect to ‘hot air’, the excess emissions allowances enjoyed by 
Russia and other former communist states represent an historic anomaly. These 
states would like to preserve their quotas into subsequent commitment periods, 
as they provide a potential source of revenue and headroom for future economic 
expansion. But other parties will insist that equity requires that permitted- 
emissions bear a realistic relation to actual emissions. All the more so, since 
these countries will be able to carry forward substantial (banked) allowances 
from the first commitment period.
Eventually developing countries must be brought into the mandatory 
control regime. The key is differentiating among non-Annex 1 countries, and 
opening the way to their varied participation over time. Elegant proposals have 
been suggested for a formula that would determine when developing countries 
would pass into a control regime.49 But the history of climate change 
negotiations suggests obtaining general agreement on any specific formula will 
be difficult. Broad principles relating abatement to higher per capita GNP and 
per capita emissions could be agreed; but specific thresholds would be 
problematic. And the pragmatic consideration of the willingness of a country or 
group of countries to assume a commitment will be central. While most 
developing nations will remain outside a mandatory regime, advanced 





























































































A number of approaches remain possible for how to actualise such 
commitments. States could accede to Annex 1 of the Climate Change 
Convention, but initially be granted generous growth allowances. Alternatively, 
a new legal framework could be established under the Convention. Emissions 
targets for developing countries would not have to follow the pattern of binding 
caps accepted by Annex 1 parties. It has been suggested that dual intensity 
targets might be suited to the more uncertain economic conditions found in 
developing countries, although some analysts remain sceptical.50
The fact that most developing countries remain outside a mandatory 
control regime does not mean that they cannot make an important contribution 
to mitigation efforts. Indeed, policies implemented in developing countries are 
already moderating emissions growth, generally as a by-product of efforts to 
secure ‘development and poverty alleviation, local environmental protection and 
energy security’.51 There are many ways such activities might be taken forward 
including systematic linkages to sustainable development activities52, further 
extension of the CDM,53 and additional programmes for technology transfer.
Orienting further international initiatives
On the international front attention should be paid to the following elements:
• Pushing forward the climate change agenda: the EU and its member states 
should continue to press for increased international engagement with climate 
change issues. One can without exaggeration speak of European leadership in 
this area over the past decade. To continue this distinctive contribution 
involves a variety of challenges discussed below, but it must be underpinned 
by the domestic measures considered above. For only if the EU is 
demonstrably on track to secure its Kyoto targets, and to drive emissions still 
lower in subsequent years, can it speak with authority on this issue on the 
international stage.54 Indeed, because the EU has played such an active role 
in relation to climate change, any failure to match deeds to words could 
seriously undermine its more general credibility as an international actor.
• Sustainable development: Europe must step up its assistance and productive 
interaction with developing countries. Links between the EU and G77 + 
China were instrumental in negotiations about the coming into force of the 
Kyoto accords. Climate change cannot be approached in isolation, but must 
be set in the context of the urgent needs of the poor and the aspirations of 
developing states.55 By accelerating sustainable development these needs can 
be met while ensuring a more environmentally benign development 
trajectory.56 This creates political and economic conditions favourable to 




























































































here are well known, and include the opening of closed EU markets 
(especially in the agricultural sector) to developing countries, debt relief, 
enhanced investment flows and technology transfer.
• Constructive engagement with the United States: it is important to engage 
with the US and other developed states that fail to ratify Kyoto. Without 
active US participation a successful long-term emissions control regime is 
impossible. The EU should continue high level dialogue with the US, and 
develop co-operation where possible — for example, on basic research and 
technology development. Care should be taken in any future elaboration of 
the Kyoto system not to establish additional obstacles to the emergence of 
collaborative abatement approaches (between Kyoto and non-Kyoto actors) 
or to the eventual re-integration of the US to the Kyoto regime. The evolution 
of the public debate within the US suggests that significant American 
engagement is unlikely to be delayed for more than a decade. And it should 
not be forgotten that when the US does decide to act it could do so with great 
effectiveness.
• Operation of the Kyoto system: it is important to ensure that the institutions 
of the Protocol operate smoothly and that they are adequately resourced. In 
the run-up to the first commitment period close watch should be kept on 
emissions trajectories, scientific developments, and experience with the early 
operation of the flexibility mechanisms. This will allow timely adjustment, 
should problems emerge, and help identify future priorities. Attention should 
also be given to other areas under the Convention including its operating 
procedures.57
• Negotiations for the next commitment period: Europe should adopt a 
positive and co-operative attitude toward negotiations for the second 
commitment period.
With respect to emissions objectives for developed states: the clearest thing 
that can be said at this point is that the EU should press for greenhouse gas 
abatement targets that will signal the intention of Annex 1 Parties to continue 
the downward trajectory of their emissions. Other things being equal, 
agreement around deeper cuts for the second commitment period helps to 
reduce the environmental risk. More importantly, it signals to domestic actors 
and to other countries (developing states, and developed countries that did not 
join the Kyoto system) a greater resolve to deal with the climate change issue. 
A further reduction in collective emissions of at least 5% would appear 
necessary if the regime is not to be regarded with derision. But a more 




























































































more ambitious target might be acceptable if integrated into a quantity-cap / 
price-cap system.
With respect to squeezing out hot air. the equity and environmental 
integrity of the regime requires a reduction of these surplus emissions 
entitlements. The most straightforward solution would be to set more 
ambitious abatement targets for states with exaggerated ‘head room’, so 
eroding the excess permitted emissions. This could raises compliance costs 
for parties seeking to buy Russian allowances. But since the sellers would 
gain from a higher price, a deal could be forthcoming to draw down hot air 
over future commitment periods.
With respect to drawing advanced developing countries into the 
abatement regime: it is important to adopt a flexible and differentiated 
approach. The least developed states, and large developing nations with 
emissions well-below world averages, cannot be expected to enter an 
abatement regime similar to that which has been established for developed 
Parties in the next few decades. But advanced developing states should be 
encouraged to accept some form of target for emissions control. Acceptance 
of such commitments by a few key developing countries would create a 
valuable precedent, and strengthen confidence in the potential of the regime to 
evolve further.
• Adaptation: in the international context this is of particular importance 
because many of the poorest countries are expected to bear the initial brunt of 
the negative impacts of the changing climate. The EU should generously 
support the adaptation fund established under the Kyoto protocol, work to 
establish an international framework for financing adaptation projects, and 
collaborate with developing countries to assist in the planning and 
implementation of adaptation initiatives in the more vulnerable regions.58 
The idea of negotiating an ‘adaptation/impacts’ protocol under the FCCC 
also deserves serious consideration.59
Conclusion
Climate change poses a major challenge for contemporary decision-makers. It 
involves the design and implementation of policy -  with implications across 
society, requiring international co-ordination, and involving substantial costs -  
in a context of radical uncertainty. It is the most complex environmental issue 
human kind has had to address. And it resolution is inevitably bound up with 





























































































The problem is long term, with roots extending back to the dawn of the 
industrial era, and a future that heralds several centuries of changing climate. 
Nevertheless political and economic decisions made in the next two or three 
decades could have a dramatic impact on rates and levels o f warming 
experienced during the remainder o f the twenty-first century and beyond. 
Technologies that would allow a major reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
already exist or are within reach. But their adoption requires substantial 
economic and social change.
The negotiation of the Kyoto agreements was a significant achievement. It 
represents a first attempt to establish a binding international process of 
greenhouse gas abatement. It has led to the establishment of more accurate 
national emissions inventories, and innovative mechanisms to link the efforts of 
developed and developing countries in addressing climate change. Yet it is not 
clear that it has resulted in an effective approach that will prove stable over the 
long term. Without participation of the world’s most powerful state the regime 
remains fragile. Uncertainty persists over how the Kyoto mechanisms will 
actually operate, the level of abatement they will secure, and the costs they will 
involve. The political determination of developed countries to agree further 
substantive reductions in the second commitment period remains in doubt. And 
the problem of gradually incorporating developing countries in the emissions 
control effort remains to be addressed.
At present powerful economic interests believe their ascendancy is 
threatened by a more vigorous climate change policy. Or at least they believe 
such a policy stance would cause them substantial inconvenience. Thus 
continued resistance to the development of greenhouse gas abatement measures 
is to be expected -  whether this takes the form of open defiance (as from much 
of the business community in the US, Canada and Australia), or of continuing 
‘guerrilla warfare’ (as from firms and sectors currently seeking exemption from 
European emissions trading). On the other hand, some businesses including 
those in the petroleum sector and perhaps now in the automotive industry are 
beginning to see possible advantages of a shift away from fossil fuels. This 
potentially provides additional advocates of a more vigorous climate policy.
So far the European Union has been able to rely on large cuts in a few 
member states to make progress towards meeting its international commitments. 
But even with a burden sharing agreement that recognises national 
particularities, about half the member states are deviating from a track that 
would meet their commitment in 2008-2012. Countries like Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland have more or less assumed that carbon control is to be left to others. And 
even the Netherlands, with a good environmental record and an elaborate policy 




























































































relative laxity of the Kyoto envelope means that formal EU targets could always 
be met by buying emissions entitlements or relying on LULUCF activities. The 
EU has pledged to resist this option. But in light of the ease with which some 
member-states have shrugged off other commitments (for example, government 
deficit levels specified by the monetary stability pact), one is led to wonder 
whether the political resolve will hold.
As we have seen, the Sixth Environmental Action Programme refers to 
the EU pursuing a global greenhouse gas reduction goal of 20% to 40% on 1990 
levels by 2020, and 70% over the longer term.60 As applied to developed country 
emissions this would require declines of 2% or more per year over coming 
decades. Whether the political will to achieve such objectives survives in a 
turbulent political and economic context remains to be seen.
Experience with other environmental issues suggest that typically it is 
only when the scale of a problem becomes evident, and the costs of delaying 
remedial action appear grave, that political leaders resolve to take decisive 
action. Thus we should not expect more than modest additional steps towards 
carbon abatement -  accompanied by much finger pointing and arm waving -  
until there is a clearer acceptance of the risks of inaction. But such modest 
efforts are not to be depreciated. They can slow the growth of global emissions -  
holding out the hope of lowered rates and levels of warming in the coming 
century. And they also provide experience in transforming social practices, 
developing technologies, and building institutions needed to make a more 
determined assault on the problem.
Viewed in historical terms, the international response to climate change 
should be understood as an evolving regime rather than a settled architecture. Its 
development involves learning about the linkages between the climate system 
and human social organisation, and complex struggles to redistribute the costs of 
adjustment. An analogy with the development of structures to manage global 
financial interactions or the world trade system suggest a complex process 
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AOSIS: The Alliance Of Small Island States.
Annex 1 countries: the industrialised countries included in Annex 1 of 
the FCCC.
banking: holding over abatement credits for use in a subsequent commitment 
period.
CDM: Clean Development Mechanism, one of the three flexibility mechanisms 
included in the Kyoto Protocol (see Box C).
carbon sequestration: long term storage of carbon dioxide in natural 
formations.
commitment period: a period of binding emissions targets under the 
Kyoto Protocol. The first commitment period extends for five years from 
2008 to 2012.
compliance regime: mechanisms to ensure states comply with their 
commitments.
COP: The Conference of the Parties to the FCCC. The highest decision making 
body of the Convention, it meets annually.
EEA: European Environment Agency.
EU: European Union.
ET: Emissions Trading, one of the three flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol (see Box C).
equilibrium temperature: the temperature that would ultimately result from a 
given atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gasses.
flexibility mechanisms: mechanisms to allow parties to the Kyoto Protocol to 
collaborate to achieve cost effective emissions abatement (see Box C).
FCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(see Box A).
G77+China: a UN negotiating block composed of developing countries.
greenhouse gas: a gas that contributes to global warming.Six gasses (or groups 
of gasses) are controlled by the FCCC: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) 
and sulphur hexafluoride (SFs).
hot air: excess emissions allowances, above and beyond those actually required 
by ‘business as usual’ economic activity.
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, established in 1988 to 




























































































Joint Implementation (Jl): one of the three flexibility mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol (see Box C).
Kyoto Protocol: Protocol to the FCCC adopted in 1997, that has yet to enter 
into force (see Box A).
LULUCF: Land use, land use change and forestry, activities that can contribute 
to the uptake or release of greenhouse gasses (see Box C).
Marrakech Accords: an agreement made in 2001 that finalised the details 
needed for the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol (see Box A).
non-Annex 1 countries: signatories of the FCCC not included in Annex 1.
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
OPEC: Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
ppm: parts per million.
pre-industrial levels of greenhouse gases: levels prior to 1750.
sinks: natural systems that draw down carbon dioxide.
stabilisation: the ultimate stabilisation of anthropogenic greenhouse gas
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